Saudi airstrikes in eastern Yemen this week underscore a deepening fracture within the anti-Houthi camp, exposing how competing objectives among nominal allies are reshaping the conflict.

On December 26, 2025, forces aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) accused Saudi Arabia of launching two airstrikes against their positions in Hadramout governorate, an area bordering Saudi Arabia and central to Yemen’s energy geography.

The strikes, reported at approximately 8:00 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., targeted units identified as the Hadhrami Elite Forces in the Wadi Nahb area.

Saudi Arabia has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility.

However, a Saudi-owned newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat, cited sources describing the strikes as intended to “send a message” to the STC.

While casualty figures from the airstrikes remain unconfirmed, earlier clashes in the same area earlier in December left 2 fighters dead and 12 wounded, according to STC-linked statements.

The strikes followed rapid STC territorial advances earlier in December 2025.

UAE-backed southern forces moved into oil-rich Hadramout and neighboring al-Mahrah with minimal resistance, after Saudi-backed units withdrew.

As a result, the STC now controls nearly half of Yemen’s territory and roughly 80% of its oil reserves, while also having pushed the internationally recognized government out of Aden.

Saudi Arabia publicly objected to these moves.

On December 25, Riyadh demanded that STC forces withdraw from Hadramout and al-Mahrah, framing the takeover as an “unjustified escalation” that threatens Yemen’s unity and border security.

Hadramout’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, combined with its oil infrastructure, makes it strategically sensitive for Riyadh.

The STC rejected the demand, arguing that its operations are necessary to combat terrorism, secure supply routes, and respond to long-standing southern demands for autonomy or independence. It has vowed to maintain its positions.

The episode highlights the unresolved divergence between Saudi and Emirati objectives in Yemen.

Since leading the intervention in 2015, Saudi Arabia has prioritized restoring a unified Yemeni state under the recognized government.

The UAE, while formally part of the coalition, has focused on countering Islamist groups and backing southern separatists, including the STC formed in 2017.

Such tensions are not new.

Saudi- and UAE-backed forces clashed openly in Aden in 2019. A truce with the Houthis in 2022 reduced overall violence, but it did not resolve southern power struggles.

The December 2025 airstrikes mark the first direct Saudi military action against UAE-backed forces in several years, signaling a willingness to apply pressure directly rather than through proxies alone.

For now, there is no confirmed large-scale ground escalation.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly massed troops near the border but has not advanced. The STC’s refusal to withdraw raises the risk of renewed south-on-south fighting, which could weaken the broader front against the Houthis in northern Yemen.

The implications extend beyond Yemen’s internal balance.

Further fragmentation could complicate Red Sea security at a time when maritime risks linked to the Houthis remain elevated. International actors, including the United States, have urged restraint, but the episode underscores how fragile the current calm remains nearly 11 years after the war began in 2014 and after more than 150,000 deaths.