Following its air campaign during the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, Israel is reportedly considering a sustained “air occupation” over Iran to prevent the restoration of Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on X that he had directed the military to prepare an “enforcement plan” aimed at maintaining air superiority, halting missile and nuclear development, and responding to Iran’s backing of armed groups. While he didn’t use the term “air occupation,” experts argue that continuous Israeli presence over Iranian skies would effectively constitute one.

“Israel will act regularly to thwart such threats,” Katz declared.

Aerial Dominance Without Ground Invasion

During the Twelve-Day War, Israel conducted deep strikes against Iranian military infrastructure without committing ground forces. This included the use of fourth-generation fighters and drones to strike targets across Iran, suffering no crewed aircraft losses.

The model draws comparisons to U.S. no-fly zones over Iraq (1991–2003), and Israel’s long-standing aerial dominance over Gaza and Lebanon. Between 2007 and 2022, Israeli aircraft violated Lebanese airspace more than 22,000 times. In 2024 alone, Israel launched its largest-ever air campaign on Hezbollah, after years of covert and overt operations.

Strategic Shifts: Iran Becomes a “First Circle” Threat

Israel historically viewed Iran as a “third circle” threat—distant but dangerous. However, military leaders now treat it as a “first circle” concern on par with Hamas and Hezbollah. “You’ve turned the third circle into the first,” said Military Intelligence chief Shlomi Binder during the war.

The implication is clear: Israel intends to proactively monitor and strike Iran from the air with increasing regularity, potentially for years.

Risks and Constraints of an Iran Air Occupation

Analysts caution that Israel lacks the logistical depth the U.S. enjoyed during Iraq’s no-fly zone enforcement. With no nearby bases or carrier presence, Israel must rely on long-range sorties and aging refueling aircraft. Repeating high-frequency strikes across vast Iranian terrain could push Israel’s air force to its limits.

Even the U.S., with its global power projection, required over 34,000 sorties annually to maintain air dominance over Iraq. Israel, by contrast, would be attempting something similar with fewer resources and deeper operational reach.

Moreover, unlike Iraq, Israel cannot mount a full-scale invasion of Iran to conclusively eliminate nuclear or missile programs—raising questions about the long-term feasibility of deterrence from the air alone.