From the Istanbul Declaration to Trump’s 28-Point Plan

If Trump insists that Zelensky sign the agreement by November 27 and does not allow more time for negotiations, Ukraine will have to continue the war relying solely on European support.

November 24, 2025Clash Report

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Mehmet Kancı

Mehmet Kancı

Columnist

U.S. President Trump, in a manner befitting his personality, pulled a surprise plan out of his hat to end the Ukraine-Russia war. The “Trump Plan,” which, in comparison, makes the peace initiative first launched in March 2022 through Türkiye’s Istanbul Declaration look amateurish, sent shockwaves across Europe, not just within the Ukrainian administration.

The reasons behind the shock caused by the 28-point U.S.-Russia plan in Ukraine and the European Union can be analyzed under three main headings:

  1. Ukraine suffering significant territorial losses and its army and weapons systems being restricted according to Russia’s demands.
  2. The U.S., in a sense, collecting war reparations through frozen Russian assets, covering the cost of arms and ammunition provided to Ukraine, while imposing an additional $100 billion burden on Europe for Ukraine’s reconstruction.
  3. The failure to consider the concerns of Western European countries, the Baltic states, and even NATO regarding potential threats Russia may pose in the future.

However, without conceding all these points, ending the war was within reach both for Ukraine and for Europe, which sought regime change in Moscow by prolonging the conflict. In March 2022, as a result of Türkiye’s initiative, the foreign ministers of both countries first met in Antalya and then engaged in lengthy negotiations in Istanbul, resulting in a more feasible and rational roadmap from Ukraine’s perspective. Yet, Zelensky, aligned with the intentions of the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. President Joe Biden, who sought to collapse Russia militarily, politically, and socio-economically, discarded this roadmap.

In March 2022, the Winds Were Blowing from Ukraine

At that time, the circumstances were largely favorable to Ukraine, following the loss of its de facto control over Crimea and Donbas in 2014, mainly due to psychological warfare. Russia’s attempt to seize Kiev and change the regime had been blocked, and the Russian army’s effort to capture the Hostomel airport near the capital had ended in a heavy defeat in front of the world. By the second week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became clear that none of the objectives in the plan prepared by Putin’s advisors could be achieved. The wind was in Ukraine’s favor. Indeed, Ukraine’s advantageous position was reflected in the document emerging from negotiations that began in Belarus and continued in Türkiye.

The Istanbul Declaration Could Have Offset Ukraine’s Territorial Losses

It is important to underline that the document known as the “Istanbul Declaration” was not a final peace agreement but a framework to be used for reaching a lasting solution. Its most important step was to provide a guarantor system for Ukraine, with participation from United Nations Security Council members and Türkiye.

The primary objective of the parties involved was to create an environment in which Ukraine could maintain its independence and current territorial integrity against Russia. Ukraine would accept the principle of permanent neutrality, agreeing not to produce or host nuclear weapons on its soil. Moreover, while the Kiev administration would not join a military bloc, it would be free to participate in peacekeeping missions of the European Union, United Nations, OSCE, and the European Union itself. Furthermore, the declaration included Russia’s agreement to renegotiate the status of Crimea over the next 10–15 years. Through the Istanbul Declaration, Ukraine could also maintain an army exceeding the troop limits imposed by Russia and possess heavy weapons with a range of 280 kilometers. The parties initialed the declaration by the second week of April, but there was not enough time for governments and heads of state to take the steps needed for it to enter into force. Provocations on the frontlines and in diplomacy rendered all diplomatic efforts under the Istanbul Declaration ineffective as of May 2, 2024. It should also be noted that, around that time, the Biden administration commissioned various think tanks to publish pieces claiming that the “Istanbul Declaration” was a fanciful initiative. Following this period, Ukraine managed to balance the fronts with weapons and ammunition flowing from the U.S. However, the failed counteroffensive in Donbas during the summer of 2023 and Ukraine’s mismanaged limited resources in the August 2024 Kursk operation shifted momentum back toward Russia. Russia adapted its economy to wartime conditions, proving that sanctions were less effective than anticipated, while the U.S. presidential elections also influenced the course of the war.

Europe, Not Trump, Should Be Questioned

At this point, Europe’s behavior, rather than Trump’s steps, must be scrutinized. Although Trump had announced during his first term that the U.S. would no longer spend money to protect Europe, the governments of Germany, France, and the U.K. did not take him seriously even during his second term. Following the Alaska summit between Trump and Putin on August 15, 2025, what happened at the White House on August 18 still failed to wake Europe from its slumber. On that day, in the Oval Office, Trump presented preliminary signals of the 28-point plan under discussion to the heads of state and government of Germany, France, Finland, the U.K., Italy, Ukraine, as well as NATO’s Secretary General and the President of the European Commission. Yet Europe ignored these signals. Consequently, following the Alaska Summit, the 28-point plan, reportedly drafted between Russian Special Representative Kirill Dimitriev and U.S. Special Representative Steve Witkoff along the Moscow-Miami line, came to light.

This plan, which permanently codifies Ukraine’s territorial losses in Donbas, Crimea, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv, relies solely on security guarantees from the U.S., imposes heavy economic responsibility on Europe, and heightens the perception of Russian threat in the Baltic region, provoked the expected reactions from European countries and the Ukrainian administration.

Can Europe Resist the Trump Plan? Can Ukraine Stand without the U.S.?

Trump’s response to objections was clear:

“If Zelensky does not sign the agreement, he can continue fighting until he loses interest.”

Western Europe, which after World War II relied on the U.S. instead of developing its own defense industry and, even after the formation of the European Union, failed to develop a joint defense identity, still expects unconditional protection from the U.S. The Western Europe that survived the First and Second World Wars and the First Cold War thanks to U.S. technological power and human resources has not reconciled with reality. Moreover, despite complaining about the Russian threat and realizing that the U.S. will not extend a hand, they continue to exclude Türkiye from military programs such as SAFE (Security Action for Europe), EMERS (Enhanced European Military Mobility Response System), and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation Defense Agreement) under the influence of Greece’s whims and blackmail.

What Will Ukraine Look Like on November 28?

So what happens now? European countries, unable to openly oppose the U.S. plan—which envisages that Washington seizes half of Russia’s frozen assets along with Ukraine’s rare earth elements—called the 28-point plan a “draft to be worked on.” To appease its European partners, the U.S. agreed to meet them in Geneva on November 23. If Trump insists that Zelensky sign the agreement by November 27 and does not allow more time for negotiations, Ukraine will have to continue the war relying solely on European support. Is this a realistic solution? Absolutely not. Current developments on the frontlines, along with corruption cases emerging in Kiev, indicate that Ukraine may face even harsher terms in future agreements. Zelensky played his last card last week by visiting Türkiye . Clearly, he sought President Erdoğan’s intervention and to use his influence with Putin and Trump to ease the conditions of the U.S. plan. Before returning from the G-20 Summit in South Africa, President Erdoğan announced that he would hold a phone call with Russian President Putin on Monday, November 24, showing that he would make the last possible effort for Ukraine. Three years after the Istanbul Declaration, the situation indicates that the physical and influence maps of the northern Black Sea and European borders are inevitably being redrawn once again.