The statement highlights Ukraine’s intensifying campaign against Russia’s air-defense infrastructure, marking a strategic shift toward neutralizing the systems that most effectively counter its growing drone fleet.

By focusing on the Pantsir network — a key component of Russia’s layered air-defense grid — Ukraine aims to erode Moscow’s ability to intercept long-range unmanned strikes and precision attacks.

“A Priority Determined by the President”

“The enemy has very strong air defense,” Malyuk said in an official briefing.

“Their Pantsir system works best against our long-range drones. Since the beginning of this year to today, we have destroyed 48% of the enemy’s Pantsirs. They produce 30 per year, but the number destroyed far exceeds what they produce.”

He added that results of further operations would be disclosed “after the fact.”

Pantsir: Backbone of Russian Short-Range Defense

The Pantsir-S1 (NATO codename SA-22 Greyhound) is a medium-range, self-propelled surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft gun system developed by Russia’s KBP Instrument Design Bureau in Tula.

Designed to protect strategic assets from low-flying threats, the Pantsir combines twelve 57E6 missiles with a 1–20 km range and two 30 mm 2A38M autocannons effective to 4 km.

Its phased-array radar can detect targets up to 36 km away and track 20 simultaneously, engaging up to four at once.

Combat Use and Vulnerabilities

First fielded in 2003, the Pantsir has seen action in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine, where its performance has varied sharply.

While effective against subsonic cruise missiles and aircraft, the system has shown vulnerabilities to drone swarms and saturation strikes, especially when isolated from integrated radar coverage.

Ukrainian forces have exploited these weaknesses using long-range unmanned systems and precision-guided munitions to overwhelm Pantsir crews.

Production Lag and Strategic Impact

Russia is estimated to manufacture about 30 Pantsir units per year, but Malyuk’s figure suggests losses exceeding annual output.

The attrition rate, if verified, would mark one of the steepest degradations of Russian short-range air defense since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.