As global tensions rise and Beijing flexes its economic muscle, the United States is under growing pressure to reduce its reliance on China’s rare earth minerals. A recent analysis by geopolitical expert Kamran Bokhari highlights the deep strategic vulnerabilities the U.S. faces due to its dependence on Chinese processing of critical minerals—dependencies that remain despite a temporary diplomatic breakthrough in June.

Following trade talks in London on June 9–10, China and the U.S. reached a rare agreement: China would expedite export licenses for certain rare earth shipments, while the U.S. would lift restrictions on chip design software, ethane, and jet engines. Yet, Beijing simultaneously warned Washington against undermining what it called a “hard-won consensus.”

The Limits of Trade Diplomacy

This trade détente, while stabilizing short-term access to essential minerals, is unlikely to last. Chinese military maneuvers—including frequent incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, joint naval drills with Russia near the Aleutian Islands, and live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea—suggest that Beijing has no intention of reducing long-term strategic pressure on the U.S.

Bokhari argues that the United States cannot afford to treat the June deal as a solution. Instead, it should be viewed as a temporary reprieve. “The deal struck last month perpetuates U.S. dependence on China for critical minerals,” he writes.

China’s leverage stems from its dominance over global refining and processing, not just mining. Even minerals extracted in Australia must typically pass through Chinese facilities before becoming usable in U.S. defense or tech sectors.

Western Complacency and the Strategic Cost

Despite years of warnings—especially since China first used rare earths as leverage against Japan in 2010—Western governments have failed to build resilient supply chains. While some countries, such as Japan and South Korea, have begun stockpiling or investing in non-Chinese mines, others have drafted critical minerals strategies without serious funding or implementation.

Meanwhile, China has steadily grown its processing capacity and is now applying export curbs on rare earth magnets, which are used in electric vehicles, precision-guided missiles, and aircraft systems.

This economic power, Bokhari notes, has real-world effects. In spring 2025, China’s export restrictions on rare earths forced the Biden administration to reverse planned tariffs in order to protect auto production.

Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Alternative

One of the few promising alternatives identified in Bokhari’s analysis is Kazakhstan, a mineral-rich country capable of supplying 17 of the 30 critical minerals essential to the U.S. economy. While maintaining relations with Russia and China, Astana has expressed strong interest in aligning with the U.S. and its allies, positioning itself as a geopolitical hinge state.

Partnership with Kazakhstan could support Washington’s larger strategy to de-risk and diversify supply chains while limiting Beijing’s influence in the critical minerals market.

A Call for a Grand Strategy

The article calls on the Trump administration to move beyond piecemeal fixes and develop a grand strategy that integrates:

• Extraction and refining capacity.
• Public and private investment incentives.
• Strategic reserves.
• Multinational supply chains involving allies like Japan, India, and Australia.
• Regulatory transparency and market reforms.

The stakes are enormous. Rare earth minerals are foundational to U.S. military dominance, advanced semiconductor production, renewable energy systems, and electric vehicles.

Bokhari warns: “America cannot accept this situation. And the key to dealing with it entails making critical minerals security a top national priority.”