UK’s Double Game Strategy in Sudan & Somalia Draws Scrutiny

The United Kingdom’s posture in the Horn of Africa is increasingly being read through the gap between its stated principles and its operational choices. As the war between Sudan’s armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued into its second year, London publicly pressed for accountability and civilian protection.

At the same time, reporting showed the UK had rejected proposals described in internal documents as "more ambitious efforts” to deter atrocities as violence escalated, including in Darfur and around el-Fasher. For critics, this combination has reframed Britain not as a distant bystander but as an actor whose caution shapes international responses to the conflict.

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, a Sudanese policy analyst, said credibility turns on the risks a state is willing to assume. “When people believe your words and your actions diverge, they stop treating you as a broker and start treating you as an interest manager,” he told Al Jazeera.

Eltayeb argued that UK’s approach had helped influence how the Sudan war is diplomatically framed, particularly amid allegations that the United Arab Emirates has supported the RSF, claims documented by UN experts and international media, despite denial by Abu Dhabi. He described Britain as “an enabler of the Emirati aggression in Sudan,” saying the effect was to “whitewash RSF atrocities in the diplomatic framing of the war.”

Writing on X on January 6, Amgad argued that for more than 1,000 days the United Arab Emirates has pursued what he described as a war of aggression against Sudan by backing the Rapid Support Forces as a proxy. He said UN reports and international media have documented Emirati involvement, accusing Abu Dhabi of prolonging the conflict, enabling RSF abuses, and deepening what he called “the world’s largest humanitarian crisis”.

“Least Ambitious” Constraint

British officials reject that characterization. Asked about Sudan, the Foreign Office reportedly said: “The crisis in Sudan is the worst we have seen in decades. The UK government is working with allies and partners to end the violence and prevent further atrocities from occurring.” It added that a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and a transition to civilian rule were essential.

The dispute centers less on stated goals than on method. Analysts note that by opting for what documents termed the “least ambitious” diplomatic path, London preserved access and alignment with partners but limited its leverage over the conflict’s trajectory.

That trade off now informs how British actions elsewhere in the Horn are interpreted. Eltayeb said the perception of caution in Sudan has colored views of UK behavior across the region, making each commercial or security decision appear part of a broader pattern rather than a discrete case.

Ports, Recognition, and Ambiguity

In Somalia, the tension is structural. The UK formally backs Somalia’s territorial integrity while holding a stake in Berbera port in Somaliland, a self-declared state it does not recognize. Through British International Investment (BII), London co-owns the port alongside DP World and Somaliland’s authorities. An impact assessment commissioned by the Foreign Office described Berbera as “a strategic gateway” and a potential alternative trade corridor for Ethiopia, embedding it in regional logistics and security planning.

Matthew Sterling Benson of the London School of Economics noted that Berbera has long been treated by external powers as strategic infrastructure, serving at various points as a British coaling station, a Soviet naval base, and now a commercial hub. As Sudan’s war spilled across borders, observers suggested the port sits within a wider Emirati logistics network that UN experts and international media have linked to alleged RSF supply routes, allegations the UAE denies.

Benson’s assessment helps frame how current transport patterns are being interpreted. Within context, Middle East Eye’s investigation revealed how an Antonov An-124 operated by UAE-linked Maximus Air conducted a series of unexplained flights between military bases in Abu Dhabi, Israel, Bahrain, and Ethiopia. The activity, which coincides with the war in Sudan and intensifying UAE-Saudi rivalry, has drawn scrutiny because of the aircraft’s capacity to move heavy military equipment, raising concerns about possible covert arms transfers.

Amid such context, Abdalftah Hamed Ali says UK’s financial exposure raises “a gap between principle and practice,” adding: “Even if London disputes those linkages, the perception problem remains.”

“Pandora’s Box”

The sensitivity sharpened last December as Somaliland’s status re-entered diplomatic debate. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Somalia’s intelligence indicated three steps had been agreed with Somaliland: “First, the resettlement of Palestinians in Somaliland. Second, the provision of an Israeli military base on the Gulf of Aden coast. Third, Somaliland’s accession to the Abraham Accords.” He warned: “If these three are implemented… Pandora’s box will be opened in the world.”

On Dec. 28, Qatar and many other Muslim countries jointly condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and international law. The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, all Abraham Accords signatories, issued no public condemnation.

Analysts say Israel’s recognition of Somaliland appears rooted in strategic geography more than diplomacy. By formalizing ties with a de facto authority on the Gulf of Aden, Israel gains potential intelligence depth and access near the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, a critical global shipping chokepoint. The move also extends Israel’s regional footprint beyond the eastern Mediterranean, linking Red Sea security to Gaza-related dynamics. In doing so, it reshapes regional leverage and indirectly constrains the influence of Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa.

For Benson, UK’s dual-track policy, formal support for Mogadishu alongside deepening engagement with Somaliland, offers access and influence while deferring political costs. Over time, he argued, such ambiguity risks weakening accountability on both sides, reinforcing why Britain is increasingly viewed as an amplifier, rather than a mediator, of Horn of Africa crises.