Israel’s covert operations in Syria since late 2024 reveal a calibrated effort to shape the post-Assad order without committing to overt military entanglement. 

Following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad on Dec. 8, 2024, Israeli helicopters began nighttime airdrops into southern Syria, delivering roughly 500 rifles, ammunition, and body armor to Druze militias within nine days. 

Two former Israeli officials said the goal was not territorial control but strategic denial: preventing a hostile or extremist-aligned authority from consolidating power along Israel’s northeastern border.  

The effort centered on arming Druze factions in Sweida province, a region roughly 100 kilometers from Israel’s border. 

Israeli officials viewed President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who led the lightning 11-day offensive that toppled Assad, with deep suspicion because of his past leadership of an Islamist faction once linked to al-Qaeda. 

While Sharaa has sought diplomatic engagement, Israeli officials said his coalition still included extremist fighters, complicating trust in Damascus’s ability to guarantee border security.

“We Were Helping When Necessary”

Weapons transfers peaked in April 2025 after clashes between Druze fighters and Islamist gunmen aligned with the new government left scores dead. 

According to Druze commanders, Israeli support at that stage included sniper rifles, night-vision devices, and ammunition for 14mm and 23mm heavy machine guns. 

Financial assistance followed a structured pattern: monthly payments of $100 to $200 to about 3,000 Druze militiamen, amounting to several million dollars annually. 

Israeli officials later acknowledged the risk of proxy overreach, recalling the collapse of Israel’s allied militia in south Lebanon in 2000 after two decades of support.

By August, Israel halted most lethal aid after negotiations with Sharaa gained traction and concerns grew over infighting among Druze leaders. 

“We were helping when it was absolutely necessary,” one Israeli official said, stressing that Israel had no intention of deploying commandos or formally organizing proxies inside Syria.  

Buffer Zones and Bargaining Chips

Alongside covert arming, Israel seized approximately 155 square miles of Syrian territory in December 2024, including additional positions on Mount Hermon, a strategic peak overlooking Syria and Lebanon. 

Hundreds of Israeli airstrikes followed, targeting Syrian military infrastructure to deny the new government access to heavy weapons. 

On the ground, Israeli forces established a buffer zone supporting residents of 20 Druze villages with fuel, food, water, and medical care.

Humanitarian assistance has continued into late September 2025, with Israeli helicopters delivering medicine and body armor even as weapons shipments slowed. 

Israeli officials have pressed for southern Syria to remain demilitarized and for Syrian forces to coordinate any entry into Sweida, conditions Sharaa has publicly rejected. 

Talks over a bilateral security arrangement have stalled partly over Israeli demands for institutional autonomy for the Druze.

Limits of Proxy Power

Internal divisions among the Druze further complicated Israel’s approach. 

In August, leadership shifted from the Military Council to a new “National Guard” faction aligned with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, triggering accusations of kidnapping, corruption, and rival collaboration with Damascus. 

Israeli officials conceded that no single Druze actor offered a reliable long-term partner.

Despite these constraints, Israel continues limited nonlethal aid and financial support, signaling a dual-track strategy: keeping pressure on Damascus while leaving space for de-escalation. 

As one Israeli adviser noted, backing a breakaway Druze state would extend Israel’s security burden far beyond its borders, a scenario Jerusalem remains unwilling to accept.