Exiled figures closely tied to Syria’s former president Bashar al-Assad are working to destabilise the country’s new government, according to a New York Times investigation based on intercepted communications. The report said former intelligence chiefs and military commanders, now largely based in Russia and Lebanon, have been quietly rebuilding loyalist networks inside Syria, with a focus on the Alawi community that formed the backbone of Assad’s rule.

At the center of the alleged effort are Suhail al-Hassan, the former elite forces commander known as “The Tiger,” and Major-General Kamal Hassan, the former head of military intelligence. Both men fled to Moscow alongside Assad but have remained active through intermediaries. Text messages reviewed by the NYT showed al-Hassan meeting collaborators in Lebanon, Iraq, and inside Syria over the past year.

Handwritten charts shared in group chats listed fighters and weapons stockpiled in villages along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with claims that tens of thousands of fighters could be mobilised. In several messages, al-Hassan signed off as a “holy warrior,” language that suggested an effort to frame mobilisation in sectarian terms.

Financing and Armed Coordination

Three people familiar with the plans told the NYT that al-Hassan was coordinating closely with Rami Makhlouf, Assad’s billionaire cousin, who is also based in Moscow. Makhlouf is said to be financing parts of the effort while distributing money to impoverished Alawi families along the coast and portraying himself as a protector of the community.

Another key figure is Ghiyath Dalla, a former commander in Assad’s now-disbanded Fourth Division, who was operating from Lebanon. In an intercepted phone call in April 2025, Dalla said: “We will not begin until we are fully armed.” Messages cited by the NYT showed Dalla distributing about $300,000 per month to potential fighters and local commanders, with individual payments ranging from $200 to $1,000.

Dalla also sought approval to purchase satellite communications equipment valued at more than $130,000. Other exchanges described outreach to Iran-aligned Iraqi militia leaders to discuss smuggling weapons into Syria while avoiding Israeli air strikes and detection by Syrian authorities. The communications referenced aborted assassination plots and efforts to acquire drones and anti-tank missiles, including weapons said to be hidden inside Syria.

Sectarian Violence as Mobilisation Catalyst

The intercepted messages date back to April, shortly after a wave of sectarian violence on Syria’s coast left more than 1,600 people dead, most of them Alawi. The killings followed coordinated attacks by former security personnel against forces loyal to the new government and were widely seen as a rallying point for ex-regime figures seeking to recruit fighters.

Former officials told the NYT that fear and economic hardship could make recruitment among Alawi communities possible, though others cautioned that resentment toward Assad’s rule remains deep after years of war.

“International Protection” and U.S. Lobbying

Beyond armed organisation, the report highlighted a parallel political track. Kamal Hassan is said to back the Foundation for the Development of Western Syria, a Beirut-based group presenting itself as an advocate for Syrian minorities and displaced Alawis. According to U.S. disclosure filings, the foundation hired lobbying firm Tiger Hill Partners and Joseph Schmitz, a former adviser to U.S. President Donald Trump, under a $1 million contract.

The foundation has publicised meetings with offices of several U.S. lawmakers, though aides described the engagements as routine staff-level discussions. People working with Hassan told the NYT he appeared more focused on building long-term political leverage than launching an immediate insurgency, including promoting calls for “international protection” for Alawi-majority coastal regions.

Syrian officials monitoring former regime figures have downplayed the likelihood of a coordinated armed uprising. Several diplomats, however, told the NYT they were more concerned about overseas lobbying, warning it could gradually normalise ideas of fragmentation or semi-autonomy if Syria’s political transition falters. Israeli actions aimed at weakening central control and encouraging fragmentation, including intensified air strikes and outreach to armed actors in southern Syria, were cited as compounding these pressures.