Egypt, UAE, and the Repeated Warnings Netanyahu Ignored Ahead of Oct. 7

Benjamin Netanyahu faces renewed questions over whether he dismissed warnings of a Hamas attack, as reports of Egyptian and Emirati alerts bring his conduct before October 7, 2023, into the center of Israel’s election campaign.

The accounts describe repeated approaches from Egypt and a personal warning from United Arab Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed.

Netanyahu has denied receiving the reported calls, and has even secretly flown to Abu Dhabi to ask the UAE’s president to deny the reports.

With Israelis due to vote on October 27, the dispute concerns both what the prime minister knew and whether he shared information with the officials responsible for preparing a response.

Egypt’s Escalating Alerts

Egypt’s warnings developed over several months, according to Arab government officials cited by The Wall Street Journal.

An initial message in June 2023 described growing instability in Gaza and urged renewed negotiations with Hamas.

In September, Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel traveled to Israel with a more urgent assessment that conditions could erupt.

Israeli officials assured him they could manage the situation.

The Journal reported that Kamel then called Netanyahu in early October after the earlier approaches failed to produce a response.

One Arab official said Egyptian warnings continued until about 48 hours before the attack.

Netanyahu’s office did not answer the Journal’s questions about the reported call. It had previously denied that Netanyahu and Kamel spoke in the months preceding October 7.

Egypt’s concerns were raised publicly soon after the assault. U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul said in 2023: “We know that Egypt had warned the Israelis three days prior that an event like this could happen.”

The Reported Emirati Call

The separate Emirati warning allegedly reached Netanyahu in late September 2023.

Accounts in Haaretz, The New York Times and the Journal describe Mohamed bin Zayed conveying intelligence that Hamas was preparing a major operation.

The Times reported a further issue: five former senior Israeli officials said the warning never reached the heads of Israel’s security establishment.

Minutes reviewed by the newspaper show that Netanyahu did not mention the Emirati alert when he met security chiefs on October 1.

He instead stressed the need for calm in Gaza and resisted suggestions of strikes against senior Hamas figures accused of directing attacks in the West Bank.

According to those minutes, Netanyahu argued that action in Gaza could undermine a prospective normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Netanyahu has denied receiving a warning call from Mohamed bin Zayed, saying any Emirati intelligence was transmitted through intelligence channels.

The UAE has not specifically confirmed or denied the reported personal warning.

What Was Overlooked?

The foreign alerts formed part of a wider pattern of missed or discounted signals.

Israel’s military obtained a Hamas invasion plan in 2022, codenamed Jericho Wall, but considered it implausible.

Female military observers along the Gaza border also reported increased Hamas training, warnings that the military dismissed.

Political and security leaders had come to regard Hamas as deterred. They believed its Gaza leader, Yahya Sinwar, prioritized governing the territory over another war.

The reports suggest that assumption shaped the handling of subsequent alerts.

They do not establish that Netanyahu received a detailed operational forecast of the October 7 assault, or that acting on any single warning would necessarily have prevented it.

Netanyahu’s Account

Netanyahu has focused on a different period: the hours immediately before the attack.

He says senior security officials detected suspicious activity but failed to wake him.

In remarks to Channel 14, he argued that an earlier alert would have prompted him to mobilize the military and air force.

“You asked me what would have happened if they had woken me up, it would not have happened.”

Security officials have rejected allegations that they concealed vital information from him.

Reporting on the overnight response indicates that officials interpreted unusual Hamas activity as potentially involving exercises rather than an imminent invasion.

Why the Reports Matter Now

The disclosures arrive weeks before Israel’s first national election since October 7.

A September Israel Democracy Institute poll found that 68% of Jewish Israelis considered the attack a major factor in their voting decision.

The timing gives the reports immediate electoral weight.

Netanyahu has opposed an independent state commission of inquiry, arguing that the process would be biased, and favors a panel divided between coalition and opposition representatives.

The unresolved question extends beyond whether warnings existed: who received them, what they conveyed, and why they failed to produce preparations proportionate to the threat.