Xi’s Military Crackdown May Disrupt China's War Readiness

China’s sweeping removal of senior military commanders is strengthening President Xi Jinping’s control over the armed forces while raising questions over whether prolonged upheaval at the top has weakened the country’s ability to conduct a major war.

The latest intervention has reached the highest levels of the People’s Liberation Army.

The ruling Politburo this week expelled Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from both the Communist Party and the military, extending a campaign that has already reshaped China’s command structure.

The disruption comes as Beijing pushes ahead with military modernization and expands deployments around Taiwan and contested areas of the South and East China Seas.

Command Gaps at the Top

Zhang had occupied an unusually important position within China’s defense establishment.

A son of a close friend of Xi’s father, he served as Xi’s deputy on the Central Military Commission, the country’s highest military command body, and had long been regarded as one of the president’s closest military allies.

His removal, alongside Liu’s, leaves a leadership structure already marked by extensive turnover.

Second-line officers have moved into important posts across the CMC, theater commands and individual services. Yet five seats remain vacant on the commission’s seven-member ruling committee.

China’s defense ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The scale of the personnel changes has sharpened scrutiny of how effectively the PLA could manage operations requiring close coordination between services and commands.

Readiness Under Pressure

China has continued weapons testing and increasingly complex military exercises despite the leadership turmoil, suggesting that routine activity has been insulated from the political disruption.

The larger question concerns the PLA’s ability to conduct a sustained, complex conflict.

Taiwan remains central to that debate. Beijing regards the democratically governed island as its territory, a claim Taipei rejects.

Zhang was the most senior serving officer with direct combat experience, having fought during China’s 1979 border war with Vietnam.

That conflict remains China’s most recent experience of actual warfare.

Ruby Osman, a senior policy adviser on China at the Tony Blair Institute in London, told Reuters that the PLA appeared capable of shielding day-to-day operations from the upheaval.

But she added that it “is hard to imagine upheaval on this scale wouldn’t create issues for more complex operations - including a full-scale Taiwan contingency.”

“But Xi clearly sees short-term disruption as a price worth paying for long-term discipline and combat readiness,” Osman said.

Xi Consolidates Control

The removals have also reinforced Xi’s authority over an institution central to Communist Party power.

James Char, a Chinese security scholar based in Singapore, said the “defenestration” of figures associated with Zhang and Miao Hua, formerly the military’s top uniformed political officer, had further strengthened Xi’s position.

“We can expect Xi to continue exercising decisive control and influence over China’s military affairs - and by extension, his dominance over the party-state, since whoever controls the People’s Liberation Army controls the party,” Char said.

Xi has overseen an extensive campaign against corruption and indiscipline since taking power in 2012.

Millions of officials across China’s bureaucracy have faced investigations of varying intensity, while scores of senior party, government and military figures have been investigated and removed.

The military campaign initially focused heavily on corruption, including procurement problems within the elite Rocket Force, which operates China’s conventional and nuclear-armed missiles.

Its emphasis has increasingly extended beyond financial misconduct to political loyalty and the Communist Party’s control of the armed forces.

Party Control Reasserted

That political dimension has been made explicit in official commentary.

The PLA Daily said Zhang and Liu had “seriously contributed to political and corruption problems that undermine the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endanger the Party’s foundation of governance.”

The paper added that they had “caused enormous damage to the military’s political development, political ecosystem, and combat effectiveness.”

Tian Shichen, president of the Global Governance Institution and a former defense ministry official, said the campaign should not be interpreted as weakening the armed forces.

“Eradicating corrupt elements strengthens, rather than weakens, the political foundation, cohesion, and overall combat effectiveness of the armed forces,” Tian said.

He said the PLA’s fundamental principle remained the Communist Party’s absolute leadership over the military, rejecting foreign assessments that the changes reflected a concentration of Xi’s personal power.

Investigations into Zhang and Liu were announced in January. Formal punishments have yet to be disclosed.

Leadership Vacancies Could Persist

The disruption at the top of the PLA may not be resolved quickly.

Char said he did not expect the vacant positions on the CMC’s senior panel to be filled before the Communist Party’s full congress in late 2027.

Xi is widely expected to secure a fourth five-year term at that meeting, according to analysts cited in the draft, adding to the importance of internal political control ahead of the event.

A prolonged period of vacancies could also complicate military engagement with foreign governments at a time of sustained regional tensions.

Defense Minister Dong Jun remains in office but sits on neither the Politburo nor the CMC, leaving him with less institutional authority than many foreign counterparts.

Zhang had played a prominent role in external military contacts. His 2024 meeting in Beijing with then-U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan was viewed at the time as an important step in U.S.-China military engagement.

It remains unclear who will assume that role.

Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund of the United States said Xi could be taking some decisions himself during the transition.

“The PLA can still execute orders, of course, through the joint staff, theatre commands, services and party apparatus,” she said.