Ukraine's Intelligence Quietly Eroding Russia’s Ability to Bomb Its Cities

Ukraine is steadily attacking one of the hardest parts of Russia’s long-range strike arsenal to replace: the aging Tu-95 bombers used to launch cruise missiles against Ukrainian cities.

Two strikes on Engels-2 in six weeks have damaged separate aircraft at a base nearly 500 miles inside Russian territory.

Analysts assess that neither bomber is likely to fly again, according to The Telegraph.

The latest attack, at the end of August, tore away part of a Tu-95’s right wing behind its second engine. A July strike on the same base severed the tail of another aircraft.

The significance lies in the scarcity of the platform. Russia has not produced a new Tu-95 since 1992.

“They’re part of Russia’s nuclear triad,” Justin Bronk, a senior research fellow for Airpower and Technology at the Royal United Service Institute, told The Telegraph.

“They’ve been used to conduct intensive missile raids against Ukraine for four and a half years. Destroying one, especially at its home base, is a politically poignant thing to do.”

Intelligence Behind the Strikes

Both attacks were carried out this summer by a specialized long-range strike unit within Ukraine’s SBU service.

The operation relied heavily on intelligence work to identify gaps in Russian air defenses and design a route into Engels-2.

The MICH-2000 drone used in the operation has an estimated range of about 1,240 miles, far beyond the direct distance to the base.

That allowed Ukrainian planners to avoid known concentrations of air defenses and use terrain to reduce radar exposure.

The vulnerability of Engels-2 reflects a broader problem for Moscow. Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign has forced Russia to defend a widening range of refineries, warehouses and other targets.

“There’s just less dense air defense cover that the Russians can put at any one site than they used to,” Bronk said. “Even something as important as Engels.”

Shrinking An Irreplaceable Fleet

The Tu-95 is one of only two Russian aircraft types, alongside the Tu-160, capable of launching long-range Kh-101 cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities.

Estimates of the remaining fleet vary. Robert Tollast, a researcher in Rusi’s Land Warfare team, puts the number at about 20 to 30 operational aircraft, possibly fewer because of the maintenance demands of a design that first flew in the 1950s.

Oryx, which tracks confirmed equipment losses, has recorded at least 10 Tu-95 losses since the invasion began, excluding the two latest Engels-2 strikes.

That makes every permanently disabled aircraft more consequential.

The Kh-101 has a range of more than 1,850 miles and carries a 400kg warhead. It can strike hardened targets, including command bunkers and thermal power stations.

“The Tu-95s are obviously really important for Russia’s deep-strike campaign, which tends to prioritize, particularly over the winter, Ukrainian power infrastructure,” Tollast said.

“So the fewer Tu-95s Russia has, the fewer of these missiles can be fired with the devastating warheads and the long range.”

The Spiderweb Logic

The Engels-2 attacks follow the same underlying logic as Operation Spiderweb, Ukraine’s June 2025 assault on Russian strategic aviation.

That operation used attack drones smuggled into Russia inside trucks positioned near air bases and struck 41 bombers in a single day.

The latest strikes are smaller in scale but potentially cumulative in effect. Each Tu-95 lost removes an aircraft from a fleet Russia cannot replenish through new production.

The pressure also creates a broader strategic problem for Moscow.

Russia has used Tu-95s for missions near Nato airspace as well as for strikes on Ukraine.

A smaller fleet therefore forces harder choices over how many aircraft to keep available for other contingencies.