How Dreams of Becoming 'Türkiye's Goldman Sachs' Crashed Into Liquidation

Tera Group spent years pursuing an ambition its executives described as becoming the “Goldman Sachs of Türkiye.”

In September 2026, that vision collapsed into redemption failures, emergency fund liquidations, police searches and detentions.

The reversal exposed the risks embedded in a financial structure built around concentrated holdings, related companies and leverage.

A brokerage that had grown into one of Türkiye’s most prominent financial groups suddenly found itself at the center of a regulatory liquidation covering more than 130 funds and roughly $18 billion in assets.

From Brokerage to Financial Empire

Emre Tezmen founded the business that became Tera in 2005 after selling his house and car.

The group expanded from brokerage into portfolio management, factoring, technology, real estate, and banking. Tera Yatırım Menkul Değerler was listed on Borsa Istanbul in 2022.

Its shares then produced an extraordinary rally. From the IPO through early 2026, the stock rose roughly 40,000% at its peak, with repeated monthly gains of 50% to 100% during 2025.

The resulting valuation reached several billion dollars despite the brokerage employing about 130 people.

Tera’s ambitions rose with its market value. Executives discussed building a full-service national investment bank and used the “Goldman Sachs of Türkiye” comparison.

The group expanded toward London and Dubai and moved further into real estate, cybersecurity and banking.

Days before the crisis, Tera was also pursuing control of Pusula Finans Holding. Tezmen became Pusula chairman on September 14.

The Machine Behind the Returns

Tera Portföy became the public face of the boom.

Its flagship funds attracted retail investors after delivering returns measured in the thousands of percent. Tera Portföy Birinci Serbest Fon, known as TLY, posted gains above 1,500% over some 12-month periods.

Assets under management climbed into the hundreds of billions of lira.

But the strategy relied heavily on concentrated positions.

Funds accumulated stakes in Tera-linked companies including TERA, TEHOL and TRHOL, as well as businesses brought to market by Tera’s brokerage.

Among them was Destek Finans Faktoring, whose stock rose thousands of percent after its 2025 listing.

Earlier filings showed extreme single-stock exposure, including a period when Tera’s own shares dominated a flagship fund.

The structure created a reinforcing cycle: fund buying pushed up illiquid stocks, rising prices lifted fund values, stronger returns attracted more investors, and fresh subscriptions provided additional buying power.

The same rising valuations benefited Tera’s listed companies and holdings.

Critics later described the system as structurally risky and marked by conflicts of interest. Tera maintained that its activities complied with existing regulations.

“I make money, the investor makes money. And what does the state lose?” Tezmen said in an interview. “There is no problem here.”

Regulation Breaks the Cycle

Scrutiny had been increasing before the collapse.

Türkiye’s Capital Markets Board fined Tera fund managers over Vişne Madencilik trading in late 2025, while MSCI raised concerns over investability and free-float conditions in parts of the Turkish market.

The decisive shift came in late August 2026, when regulators tightened concentration and related-party limits for hedge-style funds.

The changes forced managers to reduce positions in some of the same thinly traded shares that had driven previous gains.

A structure dependent on continued buying suddenly faced forced selling.

Redemptions Turn Into Crisis

The break came during the week of September 15.

Pusula Portföy disclosed difficulty meeting some redemption requests.

On September 16, Tera Portföy reported payment failures involving two large funds with combined assets of about 366 billion lira, roughly $7.5 billion.

Atlas also reported delays.

Outflows across the affected fund network reached about $1 billion in a single day.

The central problem was liquidity. Large portions of portfolios were tied up in related or interconnected stocks with limited trading volume.

Selling enough of those positions to meet withdrawals risked pushing prices sharply lower.

Tezmen blamed a “planned, deliberate and organized speculative attack” and described the crisis as a temporary liquidity shortage.

Within hours, regulators and prosecutors moved.

Liquidation and Arrests

On September 17, the Capital Markets Board froze TEFAS trading in funds managed by Tera, Pusula, Hedef, Atlas, A1 Capital, Pardus and Bulls.

Authorities ordered roughly 130 funds to be liquidated, later reported as 131.

The affected pool was valued at around 840 billion to 890 billion lira, or about $18 billion. Tera Portföy represented the largest share, with roughly 530 billion lira across six funds.

İş Bankası was appointed to oversee Tera’s liquidations, while Ziraat Bankası took responsibility for the other managers.

Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek said authorities had contained the problem.

“We have quarantined the problematic area,” Şimşek said. “There’s no systemic risk.”

The crisis also moved onto a criminal track.

Pusula Portföy chairman Muhammed Yarız was arrested, while Tera Portföy executive İbrahim Bekçi and other financial executives were detained.

Authorities imposed travel restrictions on dozens of people, including Tezmen and Tera vice-chairman Erkan Kilimci. Police also searched Tera offices.

Regulators filed criminal complaints over alleged manipulation involving several companies connected to the wider fund network.

The legal conclusions remain unresolved. But the scale of the reversal is already clear.

In early 2026, Tera could point to a roughly 40,000% stock rally, four-digit fund returns and plans for a national investment-bank franchise.

By September 17, state-appointed banks were preparing to unwind hundreds of billions of lira in funds, executives were being detained, and its chairman was barred from leaving the country.

The “Goldman Sachs of Türkiye” dream had turned into a state-supervised liquidation in a matter of days.