Ethiopia Has Aligned Itself With UAE-Backed RSF Terror Group

Ethiopia has seemingly abandoned its claims of neutrality in Sudan's war and aligned itself with the UAE and, by extension, the RSF terror group.

Addis Ababa is deepening political ties with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, while western Ethiopia appears in multiple reports as a logistics and training hub linked to the paramilitary group.

Hemedti’s reception in Addis Ababa on Thursday coincided with a reported surge in vehicles and military-related activity around Asosa, close to Sudan’s Blue Nile region.

The combination has strengthened accusations from Sudanese authorities and analysts that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government is moving beyond diplomatic engagement and toward practical alignment with the UAE-backed RSF.

Hemedti Gets High-Level Reception

Hemedti was received at Bole International Airport by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonnen, State Minister Birtukan Ayano, National Security Adviser Redwan Hussien and other senior officials.

The talks between Hemedti and the Ethiopian government were presented as discussions on “developments in Sudan and ways to end the war.”

The reception followed earlier contacts between Hemedti and Abiy, including a visit in late 2023 conducted using an Emirati Royal Jet after months in which the RSF commander had been relatively isolated.

Abiy has also met Sudanese Armed Forces commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, including in Port Sudan in 2024, and has publicly maintained that Ethiopia is not taking sides.

However, the diplomatic balancing act is increasingly difficult to separate from reported activity inside Ethiopia itself.

Asosa Emerges As a Rear Area

The strongest allegations concern Benishangul-Gumuz, particularly the corridor around Asosa near the Sudanese frontier.

A Reuters investigation published in February 2026, citing eight sources, reported a UAE-financed training camp in the Menge area capable of accommodating thousands of RSF personnel.

An internal Ethiopian security-services note cited in the report said about 4,300 RSF members were training there in early January and that the UAE was providing logistics and military equipment.

Ethiopia’s government, its military and the RSF did not respond to detailed questions cited in the investigation. The UAE denied involvement.

Ethiopia later suspended the accreditation of Reuters journalists before reinstating them in late August, without issuing a detailed public rebuttal of the underlying claims described in the report.

Military Activity at an ENDF Base

Satellite analysis by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab has separately focused on the Ethiopian National Defense Force base in Asosa.

From late December 2025 through the spring, the lab reported repeated deliveries of light pickup trucks, vehicle modifications including gun mounts, and the accumulation of tents, containers and fuel supplies.

Similar vehicles later appeared in imagery linked to RSF operations in Sudan’s Blue Nile state, including around Kurmuk. Yale warned that the military buildup could signal an imminent attack on Ad-Damazin in the Blue Nile.

Yale said the pattern at Asosa differed from activity observed at 14 other ENDF installations and assessed the base as a site for resupply, maintenance and support for operations into Blue Nile.

The airport at Asosa also saw new hangars, aprons and infrastructure that analysts identified as being associated with unmanned aerial vehicles.

August Build-Up Intensifies Scrutiny

The latest developments have increased pressure on Addis Ababa’s neutrality claim.

In late August, around the time of Hemedti’s visit, Yale reported roughly 100 additional light technical vehicles at Asosa, along with vehicles assessed as consistent with armored personnel carriers.

Additional cargo containers and transporters were also observed.

The Humanitarian Research Lab noted that satellite imagery showed around 100 newly arrived technical vehicles and roughly 15 APC-type vehicles, enough to transport a force of 750–1,000 personnel.

The lab assessed that the equipment was sufficient to support movement by a regiment-to-brigade-sized force. The increase coincided with RSF claims that it had captured SAF positions in Blue Nile.

UAE-Linked Cargo Routes

Flight-tracking data has added another layer to the allegations.

UAE-linked Il-76 aircraft and other heavy cargo planes have repeatedly flown from Emirati airfields, including Al Reef and Al Dhafra, to Ethiopian facilities such as Harar Meda, Bahir Dar and Asosa.

Some of the aircraft were operated by companies previously connected to regional military logistics networks.

Vehicle movements have also been tracked from the UAE-linked port of Berbera in Somaliland into Ethiopia and toward the country’s western frontier.

Together, those movements have reinforced the picture of Ethiopia as a potential air and land corridor for supplies moving toward RSF-controlled or contested areas.

Sudan Accuses Ethiopia of Direct Involvement

Sudanese authorities have gone further, accusing Ethiopia and the UAE of involvement in drone attacks against SAF positions and Khartoum International Airport between March and May.

The accusations included claims that drones were launched from Bahir Dar airport. Sudanese officials cited recovered flight data from a downed UAV they said was UAE-owned.

Ethiopia rejected the allegations as “baseless” and accused the SAF of supporting anti-Ethiopian groups.

The UAE described the claims as propaganda. Sudan subsequently recalled its ambassador.

Strategic Alignment With Abu Dhabi

The accusations unfold against Ethiopia’s broader relationship with the UAE.

Abiy’s government has maintained close ties with Abu Dhabi since 2018, including financial support, defense cooperation and the use of Emirati drones during the Tigray war.

For Ethiopia, the relationship provides capital, military technology and strategic leverage against regional rivals including Egypt and Eritrea.

For the UAE, according to the reporting described around Sudan’s conflict, Ethiopian territory would provide an air and land corridor less exposed to actors aligned with Egypt or Saudi Arabia than alternative routes through Chad or Libya.

That would make western Ethiopia valuable as a rear area for training, vehicle preparation, airlift and onward movement into Sudan.

Neutrality Claim Under Strain

Ethiopia has not formally declared support for the RSF.

Its officials continue to call for a ceasefire and have hosted other Sudanese political actors as well as Hemedti.

But activity reported at an active ENDF installation has pushed the issue beyond ordinary diplomatic engagement or the spillover expected from a neighboring war.

The key question is no longer simply whom Addis Ababa receives. It is whether Ethiopian territory and state-controlled facilities are being used to sustain RSF military operations.

A Wider Regional Gamble

Any deeper Ethiopian role carries risks well beyond bilateral ties with Sudan.

An RSF rear area inside Ethiopia could invite SAF retaliation while further complicating disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the al-Fashaga border region.

The conflict is also intersecting with Ethiopia’s own instability in Amhara and residual tensions involving Tigray.

Sudan accuses Ethiopia of accommodating RSF elements. Ethiopia, in turn, accuses Sudan of providing space to Tigrayan and other hostile groups.

A broader alignment pitting the UAE, Ethiopia and the RSF against an Egypt-Eritrea-SAF axis would increase the danger of Sudan’s civil war developing into a wider proxy confrontation.

Ethiopia and the UAE continue to deny operational support for the RSF.

Yet Hemedti’s high-level reception in Addis Ababa, occurring alongside the latest reported military build-up at Asosa, has made Ethiopia’s claim of strict neutrality increasingly difficult to sustain.