The Mecca Agreement: Rise of a Post-American Security Order
The Mecca Agreement could mark the beginning of the biggest shift in Middle Eastern security since the Gulf War, with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan laying the foundations of a regional order no longer built around American military guarantees.
August 09, 2026Timothy Ash
The Mecca Agreement linking Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye in a new defence and security pact signed this past week is a landmark event in regional security. The three states agree to a mutual defence clause and to deepen military and security cooperation, furthering an earlier and similar agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
The fact all three felt the need to sign such an agreement is a reflection of the worsening security situation in the region following the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, and the Iranian retaliation then, including against the Gulf states. But it also reflects an understanding that the U.S. security backstop for the region is no longer assured and regional powers hence have to step up and fill the void. Indeed, as was proven with this latest Iran war, the U.S. can, and does act, with its own interests in mind and even when these might not align, or even go counter to those of allies. Indeed U.S. and Israeli strikes appear to have strengthened Iran and undermined security in the region, while negative impacting the global economy much to the detriment of the signatories and others. This arrangement aims to better prepare the signatories for future challenges.
The fact that the agreement was signed in Mecca, and has three Sunni Muslim states as first signatories, with Egypt expected to follow, I think is also meant to send a strong message to both Iran and Israel that powerful Sunni Muslim states will not idly standby and let the actions of extremists in Iran and Israel threaten peace and security in the region. They are willing to act, albeit much is being made by the signatories that this agreement is primarily meant as a deterrence, and a defensive organisation, rather as a threat to any other party. If you attack a signatory you have to assume that their partners in this agreement will come to their defence.
The three current signatories make a powerful group. Saudi Arabia is the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam - Mecca and Medina - which brings weight and leverage in the Islamic world. It is an energy and commodity superpower with huge financial resources available through its various sovereign wealth funds (SAMA, PIF) and the trillion dollar plus in assets in entities such as Aramco. Pakistan brings its nuclear umbrella and with Turkiye has a large, battle hardened and well trained military. Turkiye has a NATO standard military, a rejuvenated military industrial complex able to produce at scale, and increasingly in military technology, particularly in drones, Turkiye has become a world beater, as seen with the activities of the Baykar company. Pakistan and Turkiye have known economic vulnerabilities - both will presumably now benefit from much needed Saudi investment and financing into their defence sectors, but beyond into their wider economies. But Turkish and Pakistani military capability, augmented by Saudi funding, could prove a game changer for the three powers combined and the wider region.
There are many challenges for the new defence arrangement. Prime will be countering the on-going threats from Iran and Israel to the wider region. But also for each how to support each other while not getting dragged into existing conflicts and stress points - Pakistan with India and Saudi Arabia in Yemen. An immediate question is will Saudi Arabia expect Pakistan and Turkiye to provide military support to counter the threat from the Houthis in Yemen to free navigation in the Red Sea and to the Saudi mainland proper? There it is possible to imagine the deployment of Turkish and Pakistani naval assets, drones and air defence assets but all in a defensive posture. It is doubtful that either would join with Saudi Arabia in direct military action in Yemen itself.
The organisation could also bring opportunities - greater Saudi financial support for Turkish efforts to stabilise Syria, and even Lebanon, will be greatly appreciated in the wider region, albeit perhaps not in Israel. There is potential for the three, and Egypt, to jointly participate in the international security organisation envisioned in Trump’s peace plan for Gaza, albeit again that much obviously rile Israel.
However, in signing this agreement all three signal that they think there is a greater role, even a responsibility, for middle powers in working to bring greater security in their own back yards. We are likely to see other states join this entity but other efforts to cut mutual security arrangements across this region and with others - with/to Europe, including Ukraine - as the U.S. withdraws or is seen as a less reliable partner.
The U.S. has interestingly welcomed this new defence pact perhaps seeing how it could provide solutions to the region’s problems and allow the U.S. to move away from a history of failed interventions in the region.
Notable that leaders of all three signatory nations have good personal relations with Trump and he sees them as problem solvers not the problem.

