Europe Needs to Learn from Turkiye and Ukraine

I spoke last week at SAHA, Turkiye’s defence tech expo, about the defence challenges facing Europe and how to address these. I thought it perhaps useful to write up my notes, especially notable given that the NATO summit is looming in July in Turkiye.

First things first, Europe needs a reality check and it needs to recognise the revolution in terms of the European strategic security landscape it now faces.

In that respect I think Europe has to get real and understand that Russia is the number one existential threat to peace, security, stability and prosperity across the continent, and beyond.

Russia has revealed this threat not only in the totally unprovoked invasion of Ukraine but also through its continuous malign actions against Europe, whether that is through cyberattacks against European interests, drone activity against European airports, sabotage against defence European establishments, threats to critical infrastructure, using WMD on NATO soil (Litvinenko and Salsbery), backing extremist far right and far left political movements across Europe, and intervening in elections (Romania, Brexit), et al.

Putin has a problem with the European model - he is intervening to engineer regime change in Europe, and its rules based and democratic order, as he sees that as the threat to his rule at home.

It has to be accepted that Putin is at war not only with Ukraine but also with Europe. It should be a “read my lips” kind of moment.

So Europe is facing this incredible and pressing challenge from Russia, at the same time as the US backstop for Europe, the US security umbrella for Europe is no longer there. This much should have been obvious for Europe with Trump’s pressure to seize Greenland from another NATO member, it’s dalliance with Russia, under Trump seeming to take Russia’s positions constantly in peace negotiations with Ukraine.

I think here we have to understand that US interests, and even values (at least under Trump and MAGA), might now be different than those of Europe. And that the divergence in interests was clearly laid bare in the recent US/Israeli strikes on Iran. These were undertaken without consultation with European NATO allies and the impact of the war are disproportionately and negatively impacting Europe through higher energy import prices at the same time as the European economy already faces headwinds.

For Europe, the war in Ukraine is the priority, and Trump’s war in Iran has diverted scarce air defence resources away from supporting Ukraine, and also by boosting oil prices - and with the US easing sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil - the war in Iran has filled Moscow’s coffers likely extending Russia’s ability to wage war on Ukraine, and thereby Europe. Further by inflaming the Muslim world the attacks have likely made Europe more vulnerable to terrorist attacks from Islamic extremists.

The US prime national security threats are likely China and, as revealed now by its actions, seemingly Iran. However, I would put both much lower on the list of security threats to Europe, where Russia sits at the top.

Further, even in terms of values, comments at the Munich Security Conference by US VP, JD Vance, suggests that the US has a different vision for Europe, where white Christian values seem to be preferable to the established European vision of a more socially liberal, inclusive, and multicultural society. The US seems to be furthering its agenda to change Europe in its mould by backing far right, socially conservative movements across Europe, including the EDL in the UK - EDL leader, Tommy Robinson was a recent visitor to the State Department in the US. Incredible that that US seems to be supporting divisive influences in the UK and Europe, which could destabilise its erstwhile allies. The US is almost becoming a security threat to Europe itself.

The question for Europe really is clear. Would the US now hold to its Article V commitments within NATO? If Estonia or Poland were attacked by Russia, would the U.S. come to Europe’s defence?

The above, plus Trump’s complaints about European allies not supporting his war on Iran, suggests that the answer to that is no. If that is the reality then NATO is dead, and Europe needs to move on with a plan B, actually a plan A.

What then is the alternative to the US backstop? And given the existential threat from Russia, how can Europe defend itself without the U.S.?

Well, it has to be for Europe to move to develop an autonomous (from the US) defence capability ASAP. Given the scale of the European economy - €35 billion, comparable the US and China in size - that should be entirely possible. Given its scale and economic muscle, Europe should be more than capable of defending itself.

However, given the neglect of the past, and over reliance on the US, it will take time to rebuild that capability - the factories needed for Europe to build the tanks, planes and ships, plus drones will take time to build. Likely Europe will need 5-10 years to build this autonomous defence capability, but if it is going to happen we need to start now.

I guess the obvious questions are what happens in the intervening period, and are their means by which Europe can shorten the timeframe to secure this autonomous defence capability?

As to how Europe fills the gap, or buys time, it is dependent on a few factors:

First, Europe has to hope that the U.S. continues to sell Europe the munitions it needs to rearm. I assume here that even the Trump presidency would not say no to European countries wanting to write big cheques for US kit and thereby creating, or assuring, plenty of precious US jobs.

But in signing these contracts Europe needs to ensure that it does not just reinforce its dependence on US systems - the launch codes - in parallel. It should be looking to develop its own defence tech and production capability to enable it to weak off its U.S. dependency. This has to be a parallel process: buy what you need to defend yourself now from the US, but plan to be in a position to build these yourself ASAP, and try not to over integrate into US weapons systems so as to make a future separation posible.

I hope here that NATO secretary general, Rutte, when he calls Trump “Daddy” does not mean it quite literally, but he really understands the real state of NATO, as described above, and his massaging of Trump’s ego is just to keep the flow of US weapons systems going for the time being.

Second, Europe needs Ukraine to hold out as long as possible in its war with Russia. The longer Ukraine lasts out this buys Europe time to get its defence in order.

I think Europe has finally understood the importance of Ukraine to its own defence, hence the EU agreement to provide €90 billion in loans to Ukraine to cover its budget financing needs for the next 2-3 years. Shame though that it took Europe three years of the war in Ukraine, and only after Vance’s speech at the MSC, for it to finally begin to really ramp up defence spending and investment in its military industrial complex. These were three wasted years.

But I think what has changed in Europe now is an understanding that discussion of NATO membership for Ukraine is a bit irrelevant, as given Ukraine’s now world leading role in drone technology will be central to Europe’s defence and in a way Europe now needs Ukraine more than the other way around.

But even if the U.S. walks away from supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia, which it has in effect under Trump, Europe simply does not have that option. Ukraine is absolutely central now to the defence of Europe, in the absence of the US.

And indeed, the only way Europe can defend itself against the threat from Russia, given the US absence, is learning every lesson learned by Ukraine on the reality of modern warfare. Ukraine can help Europe moonshot its defence to be able to defend against Russia without the US backstop.

Third, is recognising the military and defence tech and military industrial capabilities of Türkiye, and putting past prejudices, racism and Islamophobia behind Europe, and deepening defence cooperation with Türkiye. Türkiye brings so much to the table including the largest army in European NATO, a battle hardened military, and particular world leading capabilities in terms of drones, et al. It has a large manufacturing base, which can take European and Ukrainian defence tech and innovation and put these into scale.

And if Europe is actually going to put a peacekeeping force to work in Ukraine - the coalition of the willing - the only force in Europe which could field the tens of thousands of troops needed to police any peace in Ukraine would be Türkiye.

Türkiye also has critical regional intelligence and soft power capability in the Middle East, South Caucasus and Central Asia which could be invaluable to Europe. But there has to be a quid pro quo for Türkiye, which likely means technology exchange, assurances that this depending relationship is a long term partnership and will not easily change in the European political wind, and perhaps wins for Türkiye, including a new Customs Union arrangement with Europe and even some new life being breathed into the whole EU accession process. Türkiye needs to be told where that is going and if it is not a realistic prospect, what the alternative is for Türkiye? Will it have some enhanced partnership with Europe akin to the UK - EU relationship post Brexit? But what is in it for Türkiye?

Fourth is getting our priorities right and ensuring the best bang for buck, literally. I guess it is also the need for a reality check. We might have ambitions to get to 3.5% of GDP in defence spending but it will take time to get there and in the interim we need to ensure best bang for buck, to hire and train the troops, to build factories and produce tanks and drones.

But I think we need to recognise that the solutions are not just about throwing money at the problem. And increased defence spending is a zero sum game in that public finances are finite, there are competing spending priorities. Therein military chiefs have no doubt loved the Trump push to increase NATO defence spending to 5% of GDP, but do we really need to spend 5% of GDP to ensure out defence?

Remember here that in going from the 2% of GDP defence spend to 5% of GDP, the extra 3% has to be taken either from other budget line items or from increased borrowing. Both options involve costs. If we cut welfare, education, and health spending to fund defence, that likely means social services suffer, populations are less happy, and this further fuels centrifugal political forces, populism and extremism. We might then win the fight against the foreign foe - a fascist Russia - but end up destabilising our own systems to such an extent that we end up looking like the foe, even eventually allying with that foe, but losing our liberal market democratic system in the process.

Is it possible to meet the priority threats to Europe on less defence spending?

If the threat is primarily from Russia, surely a 2% of GDP spend on defence across Europe should be sufficient. Imagine here 2% of GDP on a $35 trillion economy is a $700 billion defence spend. Add in Ukraine already spending $100 billion a year, and Turkiye, close to that and Europe and its allies could be outspending Russia 4-5 to one.

And Russia, on its $200 billion defence spend has broader strategic priorities including countering the threat to China in the far east, maintaining it nuclear parity with the U.S. and China, and its imperial ambitions in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, and even Latin America (Cuba, if now less so Venezuela).

And if we just prioritised our defence spend on the risks Europe faces, we would likely be more than able to fend off the one existential risk to Europe from Russia.

The U.K. military is a good case in point. Ridiculous and over ambitious defence priorities have seen catastrophic decisions made in terms of defence spend. Perhaps Brexit and ambitions for Global Britain saw the U.K. invest in two extremely expensive aircraft carriers. I think the ambition was to be able to sail these globally demonstrating to the world that the U.K. had global reach, and defence tech capability. But the cost of these ships was such - they were built in France anyway - so hardly an advert for U.K. defence tech - that the UK could not even afford the full compliment of F35s to man them, nor the carrier support vessels to defend the carriers. Hence the U.K. has had to borrow planes and pilots from the U.S., and frigates and destroyers from European allies to man the carrier groups.

But for an island, where defence of the North Atlantic and support to our European allies is now mission critical, the carriers appear as a luxury. Better to have a larger fleet of submarines, destroyers and frigates, and allow the RAF more planes to defend the UK’s skies from the mainland UK.

Meanwhile, these expensive carriers appear incredibly vulnerable now to naval drones after Russia’s experience in the Black Sea.

But for Europe it is about needs must. Our defence is threadbare so it should be about absolutely prioritising the defence against the most immediate threat - Russia - and cutting our cloth to ensure that.

It is about priorities, it’s about better procurement and rationalising within Europe - figuring out the gaps, and who does what.

On the latter point, obvioualy there is lots of duplication. The obvious solution would be a pan European force, an Army of Europe. This would though require further pooling of sovereignty and given the rise of populist forces, and the return of the nationalism that also is not likely an optimal outcome at this stage.

Can the UK switch from a reliance on the US for supporting its “independent” nuclear deterrent to relying on France? Probably not a great option given the rise of FN and Le Pen in France.

So likely all this means better coordination and cooperation between independent, significantly more autonomous militaries in Europe. But we have to figure out the gaps in our defence which are left by a US withdrawal and have realistic plans how these are to be filled, and by who. We need to better coordinate procurement and massively improve the efficiency of procurement - which for states like the UK has been an absolute disaster - given the number of failed procurement projects (Nimrod replacement, battlefield radios, and the Ajax armoured troop carrier).

And again therein we can learn from Turkiye, and how it has been able to get much more bang for limited buck but with streamlined defence procurement. Indeed, Turkiye, as showcased at SAHA has managed to develop an incredibly innovative and potent defence industrial complex which has enabled Turkiye to punch way above its weight.

Why has Turkiye succeeded here despite much more significant financing constraints? Partly because Western sanctions forced it to think outside the box, and develop technology which it had been precluded from buying but to go down the almost fully autonomous defence capability route.

We need to stop turning up our noses, and looking down our noses at Turkiye, putting racism and Islamophobia to one side and just learn and deepen cooperation. And one obvious quid pro quo is to include Turkiye in the EU safe programme, alongside the UK. It’s simply ridiculous to think both the UK and Turkiye are included. Indeed, if both remain excluded then it sends a clear message to our adversaries in Europe that Europe cannot defend itself and is not fit for purpose.