June 23, 2025Clash Report
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have tightened their grip on strategic supply lines in northern and western Sudan, dramatically shifting the balance of power against the Sudanese army. By recapturing the Chevrelet base—positioned at the sensitive border triangle where Sudan converges with Libya and Egypt—the RSF has effectively severed military supply routes to El Fasher in North Darfur and heightened pressure on army units fighting in West Kordofan.
Once a vital humanitarian and security hub, Chevrelet base now serves as the RSF’s anchor in the northwest desert, allowing them to dominate desert corridors and secure critical access points. RSF forces have also taken control of Karb al-Toum, Al-Awinat, Al’Atrun, and Al-Malha, heightening fears among local populations and threatening further incursion into Northern State.
“The path to Northern and River Nile States remains open for RSF forces,” said political analyst Ayoub Nahr, stressing that the army’s joint force in North Darfur has been isolated and its supply lines effectively choked.
RSF advances in Kordofan have been particularly swift and brutal. The 89th Brigade, the army’s largest unit in West Kordofan, is reportedly encircled following RSF gains in Babanusa. In El Obeid, RSF forces are imposing a siege from multiple fronts, further degrading the army's presence.
In mid-May, RSF forces inflicted serious losses on army units in El Khwei, prompting a retreat to El Obeid. No major counteroffensive has followed, highlighting RSF’s battlefield momentum.
Internal divisions within the pro-army coalition have deepened. Some factions reportedly withdrew from the border triangle in protest over political disputes—namely, disagreements on government restructuring and inclusion of armed groups in future ministries. Prime Minister Kamil Idris is said to support a technocratic approach, further complicating relations within the military alliance.
According to Nahr, who once advised RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), “The border triangle is not just military—it is political, economic, and symbolic. Its loss marks a strategic setback for the army and its allied factions.”
The RSF’s control of desert routes has also revived smuggling and trafficking networks. Reports indicate an uptick in activity by human traffickers, arms dealers, and extremist cells near the Chevrelet base. Nahr warned that without coordinated regional security, chaos in the triangle could be exploited by Islamist groups active in Libya and Sudan.
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