US Presses Allies to Break Chinese Grip on Rare Earth Minerals

Washington is escalating diplomatic efforts to reduce allied dependence on Chinese critical minerals, framing supply chains as a strategic vulnerability rather than a trade issue. The planned February 4 meeting of dozens of allied foreign ministers reflects U.S. concern that China’s dominance over rare earth minerals now constrains Western defense, industrial resilience, and geopolitical leverage. The initiative links mineral access directly to national security, defense production, and long-term economic policy.

The meeting, expected to be hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, aims to advance agreements that diversify and fortify supply chains for critical minerals. A State Department spokesperson confirmed that “critical minerals are one of the key priorities for Trump Administration,” adding that agencies are coordinating to “build secure critical minerals supply chains.”

The push on critical minerals was also reinforced at the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Canada last November, where the U.S. State Department advanced U.S. President Trump’s special focus on energy and rare minerals, a framing that aligns closely with Washington’s parallel effort to rally allies behind supply chain diversification, signaling that mineral access is now treated as a core pillar of collective security rather than a narrow trade concern.

The renewed push had initially sought to conclude negotiations with European partners by January 22, but people familiar with the discussions say that timeline is unlikely to hold, pushing the dates to February.

China’s Leverage Over Defense Inputs

The urgency stems from Beijing’s control over processing and refining. China dominates more than 90% of global rare earth refining and supplies 98.8% of the world’s gallium. It is also the sole global provider of samarium, a material used in defense systems and precision-guided munitions. In April 2025, China restricted exports of seven critical minerals, including samarium, dysprosium, and yttrium, citing national security. These moves followed earlier bans on gallium, germanium, and antimony, tightening pressure on Western defense supply chains.

The Pentagon impact is explicit. Rare earths are embedded in radar systems, precision-guided weapons, jet engines, and satellite components. China’s near-monopoly means even short-term export controls can disrupt procurement cycles measured in months or years. Beijing had delayed broader rare earth mineral restrictions for one year in late October as part of an agreement between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, but U.S. officials now appear determined to reduce exposure regardless of temporary reprieves, European diplomats said.

“Economically Viable Markets”

The U.S. approach has created coordination challenges. European Union member states have been pressed to sign bilateral memorandums of understanding, while the European Commission has urged unity to prevent fragmentation. Confusion has also emerged within Washington over leadership. Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have all taken roles. “It’s no secret we need more resilient supply chains for critical minerals,” Greer said, adding the goal is “to create an economically viable market for critical minerals” with partners. Bessent discussed the issue with allied finance ministers in Washington earlier this week.

Minerals, Money, and Strategy

The mineral push also intersects with U.S. President Trump’s transactional framing of foreign policy. He has explicitly linked mineral access to U.S. financial recovery in the past, where he made it a major concern in negotiations between the U.S. and Ukraine. On his interview with Fox News in November 2025, President Trump framed mineral access not as development aid or partnership, but as reimbursement tied to U.S. support. “I want the equivalent of about $500 billion worth of rare earth from Ukraine. I want our money back” he said, signalling critical earth minerals are now being treated as strategic collateral, even in relation to U.S. allies.

While it’s not yet clear whether Ukraine is part of the February 4 meeting, mineral wealth is increasingly becoming central to U.S. leverage calculations.

Taken together, China’s April 2025 export restrictions, the delayed October reprieve, and Washington’s February 2026 diplomatic push seemingly illustrate a structural shift. Critical minerals have moved from a niche industrial concern to a central axis of U.S. alliance management, with supply chain resilience now treated as a strategic capability rather than a commercial choice.